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A. Introduction 
The question whether intoxication should constitute an absolute defence to a 
criminal charge is one that was, and still is, very controversial in modern 
South African legal policy. A juridically pure approach within the existing 
framework of criminal law principles requires that intoxication could in the 
proper factual circumstances constitute an absolute defence to a criminal 
charge. Whether such a logical legal outcome is satisfactory from a social 
policy point of view, is, however, not just an academic legal question. 
The very existence of a legal principle is dependent on whether the needs of 
the community are effectively served by the particular legal principle. Section 
1 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988 is in fact an example of 
where the interests of the public has taken precedence over a purely 
academically correct approach. 
Certain legal writers are severely critical of the offence referred to as statutory 
intoxication which was created by section 1 (1) An example is De Wet who is 
not in favour of any type of statutory offence with regard to intoxication and 
regards this type of offence as a direct application of the versari in re illicita 
doctrine1. 
1 De Wet and Swanepoel Strafreg 4th ed by De Wet JC (1985) 121. 
1 
In S v Chretien2 the Appellate Division in fact endorsed this view of De Wet, 
but the public outcry forced or persuaded the legislature to intervene. The 
legislature allowed policy considerations to protect the interests of the 
community, thereby sacrificing basic principles of criminal law. It was 
deemed unacceptable that a person who has taken so much intoxicating 
liquor should be allowed to escape liability for his actions, while a sober 
person, in his full senses, would indeed be held liable for the same actions. 
The socially unacceptable phenomenon of drinking oneself into a stupor 
would, in fact, be to the advantage of the perpetrator. 
The decision in Chretien was criticised from various quarters. Less than three 
years after the decision, Bophuthaswana created a statutory offence, 
specifically with the aim of countering the abovementioned decision.3 In 1982 
already the Minister of Justice of South Africa gave the South African Law 
Commission instructions to research this particular matter. The offence 
created by section 1 (1 ), commonly referred to as statutory intoxication, is a 
result of the Law Commission's research, and was widely welcomed from 
nearly all quarters of society. 
This history of the defence of intoxication can be compared to that of 
Germany, where there was also initially an acceptance of the juridically pure 
2 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A). 
3 See s 1 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 14 of 1984 of Bophuthaswana which reads as follows: 
1(1) Any person who, after having intentionally or negligently consumed intoxicating liquor or any 
drug having a narcotic effect, performs or omits to perform an act of which the performance or 
omission or result would have rendered him liable in respect of any offence for which intent is 
the requisite form of mens rea, had it not been for the fact that he was under the influence of 
alcohol or such drug at the relevant time, shall be guilty of an offence .. 
2 
approach under the influence of the legal academics but where the legislature 
also intervened to rectify an unsatisfactory social policy position.4 
It is of utmost importance to maintain sound principles, especially in criminal 
law, but legal scientific studies should never be a goal in themselves. The 
interests of the community, the very reason for the existence of legal studies, 
should always be the aim to which all research is directed. 
Although the provisions of section 1 ( 1) were widely welcomed, it very soon 
became apparent that the legislature had created an imperfect statutory crime 
that covered only certain aspects of criminal liability which may be effected by 
intoxication. It appears that Parliament's views with regard to the wording of 
the section were given preference over that of legal academics and three 
years of research by the Law Commission. 
The whole purpose of the Act was to accommodate the sense of justice of 
society in respect of the judicial treatment of intoxicated persons for their 
actions which were committed while they were so intoxicated.5 The 
legislature rightly deviated from a pure jurisprudential approach but 
regrettably provided a section which according to certain legal writers is 
4 S E Farran "Offences Committed under Intoxication : A comparative Survey and proposals forReform" 1984 
SACC 113. Section 323(a)(l) of the German Penal Code of 1871 as amended, provides for the punishment 
by a fine or imprisonment up to five years, of "anybody who negligently or intentionally becomes intoxicated 
with alcoholic beverage or other intoxicating substance ... if he commits an illegal act in this intoxicated 
condition for which he cannot be punished because, due to his intoxication, he cannot be held criminally 
liable for the actual crime,'' (Translation as it appears in Farran op cit). 
5 A Paizes "Intoxication through the Looking Glass" 1988 SAU 777. 
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unworkable, illogical and inconsistent.6 With this section the legislature has 
attempted, but only with a reasonable amount of success, to prevent 
intoxicated persons from escaping liability, which is obviously an improvement 
of the situation after Chretien.7 While there is room for improvement, the 
existence of section 1 ( 1) cannot and should not be questioned. 
6 Paizes op cit (supra n 5) 777. 
7 Supran 2. 
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B. The Law Relating to Intoxication as a defence before 1998. 
i) The Law before Chretien. 
Legal systems based on the nulla poena sine culpa8 principle seek to punish 
only deliberate and negligent forms of criminal conduct9 and there is a 
reluctance to allow intoxication to lead to the acquittal of an accused. 
The law before the Chretien decision displayed this abovementioned 
reluctance. Before 1988 there was no law that specifically dealt with the 
subject of drunkenness so the courts merely looked at the ordinary principles 
of criminal law, whose rules in fact produced very clear guidelines.10 
Roman-Dutch law did not recognise voluntary intoxication as a defence and 
as a general rule nor did South African law. This was as a result of the 
importance of public policy as was clearly indicated in R. v. Bourke.11 
The consumption of alcohol may have many effects on an individual. It may 
affect a person's ability to control his muscular movements or his ability to 
8 No punishment without fault. 
9 Farran op cit (supran4) 109. 
10 V Singh "The Development of Judicial Interpretation oflntoxication as a Defence in Criminal Law" 1987 
TLJ108. 
11 1916 TPD 303. In this case Wessels J. said that "to allow drunkeness to be pleaded as an excuse would lead 
to a state of affairs repulsive to the community .... The regular drunkard would be more immune from 
punishment than the sober person." 
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appreciate the nature and consequences of his conduct as well as its 
wrongfulness. He may, as a result of the intoxication, not be able to 
distinguish between right and wrong, or he may lack the ability to resist the 
temptation to do wrong. He may become impulsive and confident, and all 
these factors have an effect on criminal liability. Intoxication can affect the 
individual's capacity to act in the legal sense; he could be in a state of 
automatism. If the person did in fact "legally" act, intoxication may prevent 
him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct or acting in 
accordance with such appreciation. Intoxication may exclude the intention for 
a specific crime or serve as a ground to be taken into account for the 
purposes of sentence.12 
A clear distinction must be drawn between voluntary and involuntary 
intoxication. In the case of involuntary intoxication, the intoxication took place 
with a person's conscious and free intervention, and this is a complete 
defence on any criminal charge.13 This is not only the case in South African 
law but also in most other countries, including England.14 
There are three circumstances in which voluntary intoxication can occur. 
Firstly, an actio libera in causa is the situation where the perpetrator does not 
have the courage to commit a crime, but drinks to gain the necessary 
12 CR Snyman Criminal Law 3rd ed (1995) 208. 
13 S v Innes Grant 1949 1 SA 753 (A); S v Johnson 1969 1 SA 201 (A); S v Els 1972 4 SA 696 (f); 
S v Gardiner 1974 4 SA 304 (R). 
14 R v Kingston (1994) 3 All ER 353 (HL). 
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courage, knowing that he will be able to commit the crime once intoxicated. It 
is fairly clear that in this instance, intoxication is no defence whatsoever.15 
Secondly, the chronic use of alcohol may lead to certain forms of mental 
illness such as delirium tremens. to name but one example. Here the 
ordinary principles of criminal law relating to mental illness apply and the 
accused should be found not guilty of a crime, but will be committed to a 
psychiatric hospital or prison for an undetermined period, in terms of sections 
77, 78 and 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
The remaining cases of voluntary intoxication are relevant to this discussion. 
With regard to them there are two opposing schools of thought, namely the 
"unyielding" and the "lenient" approaches.16 These two approaches may 
better be described as a social or moral approach in contrast to a 
jurisprudentially correct approach. 
The unyielding or social approach holds that it is not in the interests of the 
community that a person who is sober when he commits a crime be punished, 
while a person who commits the same criminal act while he is under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor is excused. 
15 S v Ndhlovu 1965 (4) SA 692 (A); S v Baartman 1983 4 SA 393 (NC). 
16 Snyman op cit (n 12) 210. 
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In S v 817 (decided in 1961) the Natal Provincial Division held that the ability 
to discern between right and wrong was not relevant where the defence of 
intoxication was raised, but relevant only to the defence of insanity, and that 
the onus of proof to negative mens rea was on the accused. 
Carey J stated "... . voluntary drunkenness in itself is no defence .... ". This 
case is a clear example of the unyielding approach. The biggest danger of 
this approach is, however, that it is moving into the realm of the much 
criticised versari doctrine, in terms of which a person is automatically held 
criminally liable for all the consequences which flow from his illegal act.18 The 
Appellate Division has specifically excluded this doctrine from South African 
law. 19 
The lenient or jurisprudential approach holds that if the ordinary principles of 
liability are applied to the actions of an intoxicated person there may be 
circumstances in which such person would escape criminal liability completely 
on the basis that his intoxication precluded him from performing a voluntary 
act or that he lacked either criminal capacity or the intention required for a 
conviction. 
17 1961 (4) SA 792 (N). 
18 Singh op cit (supran 10) 110. 
19 S van der Mescht 1962 (1) SA 521 (AD) and S v Bernardus 1965 (3) SA 287 (A). 
8 
In the period before Chretien20 the approach changed between the two 
opposing schools of thought. According to common law writers21 voluntary 
intoxication could never be a defence to a criminal charge, but as the years 
proceeded, the courts attempted to adopt a stance between the unyielding 
and lenient approach by following the English "specific intent" rule. According 
to this rule, a distinction must be drawn between crimes which require 
"specific intenf', and those that do not - in other words, those that merely 
require an "ordinary intent."22 In crimes requiring "specific intent" voluntary 
intoxication would negate the "specific intent", but the accused could be found 
guilty of a less serious offence which merely required an "ordinary intent". An 
example is that a murder conviction could be "reduced" to one of culpable 
homicide. In crimes not requiring "specific intent", voluntary intoxication was 
no defence whatsoever, but could merely be regarded as a mitigating factor 
for the purposes of sentence.23 
The criticism against the "specific intent" theory and the Johnson24 case is the 
difficulty of determining which crimes require a "specific intenf' and which do 
not. Many critics (Singh in particular) state also that the Johnson case is 
incompatible with the general principle of our law that a voluntary act is 
required for criminal responsibility and that the judgement amounts to an 
20 Supran 2. 
21 Matthaeus Prol. 2 14; Voet 47 10 l; Moorman In12 25-31; Van der Linden 2 1 5; Damhouder 59 7. 
22 Snyman op cit (n 12) 211; Singh op cit (n 10) 112; See also J Burchell and J Milton Principles of Criminal 
Law 2nd ed (1997) 262 and EM Burchell and PMA Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol I 
General Principles of Criminal Law 3rd ed by JM Burchell (1997) 184. 
23 S v Johnson 1969 (1) SA 201 (A). 
24 Johnson supra (n 22). 
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application of the versari doctrine.25 It is therefore clear that the law applied 
by the courts prior to Chretien was the subject of criticism. The whole 
concept was, however, clarified in the Chretien26 case. 
ii) The Chretien Decision 
The facts of the Chretien case were that a particular person (X) attended a 
party where he and other persons consumed large quantities of liquor. Later 
that night he left in his motor vehicle and drove into other partygoers who 
were standing in the street. One person was killed and five were injured. On 
the charge of murder, X was convicted of culpable homicide, as he had 
expected the people to move out of his way, and thus had no intent to take 
the life of a person. Because of this lack of intention, he could also not be 
found guilty on the five charges of attempted murder. The Appellate Division 
held that X did not even have the intention to commit common assault with 
regard to the five injured people.27 
The specific legal points which were clarified by Rumpff C.J. in this decision, 
are firstly that the "specific intent" theory in connection with intoxication is 
25 Singh op cit (supra n 10) 112. 
26 Supran 2. 
27 Chretien supra (n 2) 1103B - C. 
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unacceptable and should be rejected. 28 Intoxication is thus capable of 
excluding even "ordinary intent". Secondly, if a person is so under the 
influence that his muscular movements are involuntary, there can be no act in 
the legal sense by the perpetrator and he cannot be found guilty of any crime, 
even though his condition may be attributed to voluntary intoxication29. 
Thirdly, a person may be under the influence to such a degree that he 
completely lacks criminal capacity. This will, however, only occur in 
exceptional circumstances, namely where the person is no longer aware that 
what he is doing is wrong.30 It was emphasised by Rumpff C.J. that the 
decision that a perpetrator did not act voluntarily or was not criminally 
responsible or that he lacked the required intention, was not one to be taken 
lightly.31 
Because of the rejection of the "specific intent" theory, all uncertainty with 
regard to intoxication as a defence had been removed and it could now be 
regarded as a complete defence on any criminal charge. After the decision, 
intoxication could have any one of the following four effects.32 
a) It may prevent a person from acting in the legal sense of the word. 
b) If he could in fact perform a voluntary act, the intoxication may exclude 
his criminal capacity. 
28 Chretien supra (n 2) l 103H. 
29 Chretien supra (n 2) l 104E-F 
3° Chretien supra (n 2) 1106F. 
31 Chretien supra (n 2) 1106F - G. 
32 Snyman op cit (supra n 12) 213. Cf also Burchell and Milton op cit (supra n 22) 264 and also 
Burchell and Hunt op cit (supra n 22) 187. 
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c) If a person could perform a voluntary act and also had criminal 
capacity, the intoxication might have the result that he lacked the 
intention required for the crime with which he is charged. 
d) If found guilty of a crime, the extent of a person's intoxication may 
serve as a ground for the mitigation of punishment. 
Clarity had thus been obtained from the Appellate Division and intoxication 
firmly entrenched as a complete defence. The jurisprudentially correct 
approach had been unequivocally accepted. 
iii) The Aftermath and Criticism of Chretien 
Public opinion with regard to the judgement was not favourable. This 
necessitated the then Minister of Justice to task the South African Law 
Commission to investigate the whole question of intoxication as a defence to 
a criminal charge. Their report33 specifically dealt with offences committed 
under the influence of liquor or drugs. After a thorough study of the whole 
matter they recommended that although very few cases occur in practice 
where an accused is completely acquitted by reason of intoxication, and that 
when they do occur they are limited to crimes requiring intent, legislative 
intervention was required. 
The Commission submitted the following draft bill:34 
33 South African Law Commission "Offences Committed Under the Influence of Liquor or Drugs" Project 49 
1986. 
34 South African Law Commission "Offences committed under the influence of Liquor or drugs" 1986 Project 
49 Report 118. 
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1 ( 1 ) Any person who voluntarily consumes liquor or any drug or substance 
which affects his mental faculties, knowing that such liquor, drug or 
substance, has that effect and who while his mental faculties are thus 
affected, commits an act for which he would have been criminally liable 
had his mental faculties not been thus affected, shall be guilty of an 
offence and shall be liable on conviction to any punishment, except the 
death penalty, which could have been imposed on him had he been 
held criminally liable for such act. 
(2) If, in a prosecution on a charge of any offence, it is found that the 
accused is not criminally liable for the offence charged, owing to the 
fact that his mental faculties had been affected by liquor or any drug or 
any other substance, the accused may be found guilty of the offence in 
subsection (1) if the evidence proves such offence. 
In the second reading debate of the Criminal Law Amendment Bill in the 
various Houses of Parliament, all parties agreed with the views of the 
commission that legislative intervention was necessary and that a policy, 
approach was more preferable to the jurisprudentially correct approach 
applied by Rumpff C.J. in the Chretien case35. 
35 Hansard Second Reading Debates of Parliament, 1988 Vol. Column 875-1200. 
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The Chretien decision created legal certainty but also justice and fairness to 
the individual. Support for the Chretien approach should not only be based 
on the fact that it conforms to the general principles of criminal law but also 
on the fact that it protects individuals from the far-reaching consequences of 
the criminal law system. Schreiner ACJ stated in R v Krull:36 "In any system 
of criminal law, the problem is likely to arise of how best to reconcile the 
importance of enforcing proper standards, regarded objectively, with the 
importance of treating the individual fairly." 
The best wishes of an individual are not always in the interests of society. 
The criminal law system continuously balances these contrasting interests, 
and the Chretien37 judgement clearly swung the pendulum too far towards 
the interests of the individual. It is submitted that even to a legal purist there 
has to be repulsion to the idea of an intoxicated person escaping liability while 
a sober person must be punished. While Chretien cannot be faulted on 
grounds of logic or conformity with general principles, the judgement definitely 
miscalculated the community's attitude to intoxication.38 
36 1959 (3) SA 392 (A) 396 F-G. See also Burchell and Milton op cit (supra n 22) 276. 
37 Supran 2. 
38 J. Burchell "Intoxication after Chretien- Parliament intervenes" 1988 SACJ 274. 
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C. Legislation - Parliament intervenes 
i) Section 1(1).39 
The section reads as follows: 
1 (1) Any person who consumes or uses any substance which impairs his 
faculties to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or to act in 
accordance with that appreciation, while knowing that such substance 
has that effect, and who, while such faculties are thus impaired, 
commits any act prohibited by law under any penalty, but is not 
criminally liable because his faculties were impaired as aforesaid, shall 
be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to the penalty, 
except the death penalty, which may be imposed in respect of the 
commission of that act. 
1 (2) If in any prosecution for any offence it is found that the accused is not 
criminally liable for the offence charged on account of the fact that his 
faculties referred to in subsection (1) were impaired by the 
consumption or use of any substance, such accused may be found 
guilty of a contravention of subsection (1 ), if the evidence proves the 
commission of such contravention. 
39 Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Amend Act 1of1988. 
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ii) Desirability of a statutory crime 
The harshest criticism against section 1 is the very fact that it even exists, 
irrespective of its wording, and that the section amounts to a statutory form of 
versari.40 The fact that any deviation by the legislature from the Chretien 
decision would entail a departure from a jurisprudentially pure scientific 
approach also evoked severe criticism from many legal academics. Snyman 
does not agree with this criticism of section 1 ( 1) and explains his opinion with 
the following examples. If a person loosens the nuts of the wheels of his 
bicycle, he cannot complain if he later falls as a result of a wheel coming off 
while he is in motion. Snyman also uses the argument of a person who 
loosens his car's brake cable. He cannot complain if he is later involved in a 
collision. The same principle dictates that if a person voluntarily starts 
drinking, he ought not to complain if, in his intoxicated state, he commits a 
crime. A sober person has powers of resistance which enable him to 
overcome temptation to commit a crime. In consuming large amounts of 
alcohol, a person knowingly destroys this resistance as the person in the 
example who loosened his car's brake cable, and thus has no grounds for 
complaining if he is held accountable for his actions.41 
The legislature's attempt to balance public policy, which requires that the law 
should protect society from harmful conduct, with the ideal that the law should 
40 Snyman op cit (supra n 12) 216. 
41 Snyman's views were quoted with approval in S v Maki 1994 2 SACR 414 (EC). Compare also the 
sentiments expressed in S v Pieterson 1994 2 SACR 434 (C). 
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always ensure justice and fairness to an individual, is understandable and 
desirable. It is submitted that although this statutory offence does move into 
the realm of the versari rule, it is not a direct application of it, and like all legal 
rules does not operate in a vacuum but in a social order with practical 
needs.42 
iii) Subdivision of requirements for a section 1(1) conviction 
Various different writers, for example Paizes,43 Burchell44 and Snyman45 
have expounded the requirements for a conviction of the crime created in 
section 1 (1 ). Snyman"s views were substantially endorsed in S v 046, so they 
will be explained here. 
Snyman divides these requirements into two groups. The first group refers to 
the circumstances surrounding the consumption of the liquor and the second 
group to the circumstances surrounding the commission of the "prohibited" 
act. 
The first group requirements are: 
a) The consumption or use by X of ...... . 
b) "any substance" ...... . 
c) which impairs his faculties (as described in the section) 
d) while knowing that such substance has that effect. 
42 C R Snyman "Aanspreeklikheid vir wandade gepleeg in dronkenskap : Bophuthatswana neem die leiding -
Strafregwysigingswet 14van1984 (Bophuthatswana)" 1985 SACC 70. 
43 Op cit (supra n 5) 779. 
44 Op cit (supra n 22) 275. See also Burchell and Milton op cit (supra n 22) 266 and Burchell and Hunt op cit 
(supra n 22) 188. 
45 Op cit (n 12) 217. 
46 1995 2 SACR 502 (C) 513. 
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The second group of requirements are: 
a) the commission by X of an act prohibited by the criminal law 
b) while his faculties are thus impaired and 
c) who is not criminally liable for the substantive crime because his "faculties 
were impaired as aforesaid". 
Both groups of requirements must be present for a conviction under section 1 (1 ).47 
The trial court in S v Mphungatje48 asked the court of review to lay down specific 
guidelines for the application of section 1 (1 ). The reviewing court, however, decided 
that this was not desirable and deemed it more appropriate that case law should be 
afforded the opportunity to develop on the basis of the solution of particular 
problems. In S v Lange49 the court did in fact set out the requirements for a 
. conviction. They are: 
a) the consumption or use of an intoxicating substance by the accused; 
b) the impairment of his faculties; 
c) the accused's knowledge of its effect; 
d) the commission of an act prohibited by law whilst his faculties were so 
impaired; and 
e) that the accused is not criminally liable of any substantive offence because 
his faculties were so impaired. 
47 Snyman op cit (n 12) 217. 
48 1989 (4) SA 139 (0) 
49 1991 (1) SA 307 (W). 
18 
The court in S v Hutchinson50 also set out a list of requirements for conviction 
which substantially coincided with the views of Snyman51 and the court in the 
Lange52 case. It thus appears that there are not problems with regard to the 
interpretation of the particular statute but merely - as will later become clear -
to its application in practice. 
iv) Elements of the offence 
(a) "Substance" 
To briefly analyse subsection (1 ), one would have to begin with a 
definition of "substance". A "substance" may be defined as any 
particular kind of matter.53 When trying to determine which substances 
the legislature was referring to, one would have to look at the result or 
effect that a substance has on a person. According to the wording of 
section 1 (1) any substance which impairs a person's faculties to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or to act in accordance with 
such appreciation, would qualify as a substance to which the 
legislature was referring to when he created section 1. In practice this 
would imply alcoholic drinks, various drugs and/or various forms of 
medication. The nature of the substance or its specific effect is not 
what is important. The drug may even be a suppressant with a 
calming effect. What is important, however, is that the substance must 
50 1990 (1) SASV 149 (D). 
51 Op cit (n 12) 217. 
52 Supra (n 49). 
53 A S Hornsby Oxford Advanced Dictionary 20th ed (1982) 862. 
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cause the person to be incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of 
his actions or to act in accordance with such appreciation. The person 
must "consume or use" such substance. "Consume" may be defined 
as "eat or drink; use up; get to the end of'.54 "Use" may be defined 
as: "using or being used".55 The substance may thus be taken in any 
manner, whether it be by mouth or by injection or by inhalation. 
b) Criminal capacity 
The substance must affect the criminal capacity of the person 
consuming it. Criminal capacity consists of cognitive and conative 
legs, both being psychological components. A person's power to 
differentiate and/or his powers of resistance may be affected by the 
consumption of a substance, and if any one of the two is affected, the 
person does not have criminal capacity. For many years, there was, 
besides mental illness and youth, no general defence of criminal 
incapacity in our law. However, since the decisions in S v Arnold56, 
S v Campher57 and S v Laubscher58 there is now a defence which is 
described by the courts as "non-pathological criminal incapacity". This 
defence is broad enough to cover cases in which criminal capacity is 
excluded by intoxication.59 Various authorities have made it clear that 
54 Hornsby op cit (n 53) 183. 
55 Hornsby op cit (n 53) 947. 
56 1985 (3) SA 256 (C). 
57 1987 (1) SA 940 (A). 
58 1988 (1) SA 172 (A). 
59 CR Snvman "Die verweer van nie-patalogiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid in die strafreg" July 1989 TRW 1. 
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this defence is one of law and not one of psychology.60 Rumpff C J 
ruled in the Chretien case that criminal capacity may be lacking where 
a person is so drunk that he cannot appreciate what he is doing, or 
cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or that his inhibitions 
have substantially crumbled.61 Section 1 (1) statutorily confirms the 
existance of criminal incapacity as a result of intoxication, as it is a 
requirement for a conviction of the crime created in section 1 (1 ). The 
wording of the test for criminal liability is included in the definition of the 
crime in section 1 (1 ), and thus forms an integral part of the 
requirements for a conviction of the offence created by section 1 (1 ). 
A more difficult problem is how the court will actually decide whether a 
person lacks criminal capacity due to non-pathological factors such as 
intoxication. Rumpff C J stated in Chretien that this was not a finding 
that should easily be made by a court. There must be clear evidence 
of the fact and a difference should be drawn between an ordinary 
inebriated person and one who is so drunk that he lacks criminal 
capacity.62 The accused must merely lay a basis for the defence and 
then the state will have to prove the person's criminal capacity.63 
60 S v Gesualdo 1997 (2) SACR 68 (W). 
61 Chretien supra (n 2) 1106 F. 
62 Chretien supra (n 2) 1106F - G. See also S v Pienaar 1990 (2) SACR 18 (T). 
63 S v Wiid 1990 (1) SACR 560 (A); S v Campher supra (n 57) 966 H-1. 
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No psychiatric evidence is necessary for this defence to succeed64. 
Section 1 (1) requires the court to find that the accused lacked criminal 
capacity and in S v Kensley65 Van den Heever JA suggests an 
objective test in that an accused's lack of control should be tested 
against the assumed capacity of the rest of the members of society to 
control themselves in such situations. An objective test may, however, 
not be the most appropriate way to test criminal capacity, which is a 
subjective enquiry.66 The mere testimony of the accused may be 
sufficient to enable the court to make the finding that a person lacks 
criminal capacity.67 
c) Knowledge 
The accused should know that the substance will have the effect of 
impairing his faculties. From the wording of the statute it appears as if 
direct knowledge is required, but it is submitted that if a person 
foresees the possibility of the substance affecting his faculties and 
reconciles himself with this possibility, it will be sufficient for a 
conviction under section 1 (1 ). With well-known narcotic substances 
such as alcohol or cannabis, the court's finding should not be difficult, 
but with less well-known substances, such as medication prescribed by 
a medical doctor, the statute requires that the court must be convinced 
that the person had knowledge of the effect of the substance. It is 
64 Snyman op cit (supran 12) 174. 
65 1995 (1) SACR 646 (A). 
66 N Boister "General Principles of Liability" 1995 SA.CJ 368. 
67 Kensley supra (n 65). 
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submitted that the state need not prove that the accused specifically 
knew that the specific substance would affect him specifically. A 
general knowledge or understanding that the intake of the substance 
might impair his faculties, is sufficient.68 
d) Act 
The accused has to act and the act should constitute the act required 
for a conviction of any crime besides the fact that the perpetator lacked 
criminal responsibility. Section 1 (1) cannot exist independently of the 
substantive or original crime with which the accused was charged. 
Snyman refers to section 1 ( 1 ) as a parasite which cannot exist without 
the crime of which the accused would have been found guilty if his 
faculties were not impaired by a particular substance.69 If a person 
would have been entitled to an acquittal on the "original" crime 
because he acted in private defence or in an emergency situation, he 
is also entitled to be acquitted of section 1 ( 1) as the requirements for a 
conviction on the "original" charge would have not been met. 70 The 
accused's faculties must be impaired at the time when he commits the 
prohibited act.71 The section does not refer directly to omissions as its 
former Bophuthatswana counterpart but it may be argued that as in all 
other substantive crimes the "act" refers to a physical act or an 
68 ~ supra (n 49). See also Burchell and Hunt op cit (supra n 22) 191. 
69 Snyman op cit (n 12) 220. 
70 S v Bazzard 1992 (1) SACR 302 (NC). 
71 S v Mbele 1991 (1) SA 307 (W). 
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omission. However, dealing with a statutory crime one would have 
expected the legislature to specifically include omissiones within the 
scope of the conduct it wishes to criminalise, if it had been its intention 
to do so. It is thus not clear whether omissions will be included under 
the scope of the section or not. 
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D. Evaluation and Criticism of Section 1(1) 
i) Creation of a separate crime 
The crime of which the accused is found guilty is of a contravention of section 
1 (1 ). This is a separate and independent crime to the "original" charge put to 
the accused. The legislature tried to avoid applying the versari in re illicita 
doctrine by creating a separate statutory offence. 
The courts have not always been consistent in their treating section 1 (1) as a 
separate offence. In S v Oliphant72 the court continually referred to the 
"eintlike" or "werklike" offence which the accused committed. Although mere 
mention of the offence which was initially put to the accused cannot be 
criticised, there is in fad no "werklike misdryf' of which the accused is 
convicted, except the contravention of section 1 (1 ). 
This view is confirmed in S. v Pienaar73 and S v Riddels74 . In S v Oliphant 75 
the court suspended the sentence for a conviction of section 1 (1) on condition 
that the accused was not again convicted of the charge with which he was 
initially charged. This is in fact not recognising the independence of section 
72 1989 (4) SA. 169 (0) 
73 1990 (2) SASV 18 (T). 
74 1991 (2) SASV 529 (0). 
75 Supra (n 72). 
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1 (1) as an independent and separate offence.76 In the Riddels77 case it was 
clearly stated that if the accused was found not guilty on the "main" charge, 
any suspended sentence should only be on condition that the accused be not 
found guilty of contravening section 1 (1) for a particular period again. More 
recent cases have, however, contradicted this approach.78 In these cases it 
was decided that there should be a reference to an "original" charge in the 
conditions of a suspended sentence imposed after a conviction of section 
1 (1 ). It is submitted that this is in fact the correct approach and it does not 
threaten the existence of section 1 ( 1 ) as a separate and independent crime. 
It is in the interests of an accused that the conditions of suspension of a 
sentence be not too wide. There must also be a causal connection between 
the prohibited act performed by the accused and the prohibited act that could 
bring into operation the suspended sentence. 
ii) Voluntary/Involuntary Intoxication 
The wording of section 1 (1) is not clear in all respects. The legislature did not 
state whether section 1 (1) should be applied only to cases of voluntary 
intoxication or only cases of involuntary intoxication or both. The application 
of the section is thus in the discretion of the courts. It is submitted, however, 
that it was the intention of the legislature to limit the application of section 1 ( 1) 
to cases where the accused voluntarily consumed the substance. 79 
76 Pienaar supra (n 62); Riddels supra (n 74). 
77 Supra (n 74). 
78 Maki supra (n 41); Pieterson supra (n 41); Q supra (n 46). 
79 Snyman op cit (n 12) 217; Paizes op cit (supra n 5) 782. Burchell and Hunt op cit (supra n 22) 189. 
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According to the common law, an involuntarily intoxicated accused is dealt 
with in terms of the general principles of the criminal law. 80 Thus, if an 
accused who involuntarily became intoxicated cannot act, has no criminal 
capacity or no mens rea, he will escape liability. There is no indication that 
the legislature intended to change this position. 
In section 1 ( 1) the legislature uses the phrase "while knowing that such 
substance has that effect." This could be interpreted to mean that the 
legislature did not intend to include cases of involuntary intoxication. 
Knowledge of the effect of the intoxicating substance is made the central 
concern.81 It would also not be in the interests of justice that the position of 
an involuntarily intoxicated wrongdoer be worsened by a conviction under 
section 1 (1 ). If a person was ignorant of the fact that he was consuming a 
substance, it would seem harsh to treat him in the same manner as a wild 
drunkard on a drinking spree. Ignorance is, however, not the only criterion for 
voluntariness. Force or duress may be the reason for the consumption or use 
of an intoxicating substance. 
It is a general rule that only voluntary acts attract criminal liability82. Where 
the consumption of a substance is a specific element of the offence, one 
could only attach blame to a person who voluntarily consumed or used the 
substance. If a person knows a particular substance will impair his faculties, 
80 S v Hartvani 1980 (3) SA 613 (T). See also R v Innes Grant supra (n 13). 
81 Paizes op cit (supran 5) 783. 
82 S v Mkize 1959 (2) SA 260 (N); S v Ahmed 1959 (3) SA 776 (W); S v Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1 (A); 
S v Ncube 1978 (1) SA 1178 (R). 
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but does not know that he is consuming the substance or is forced to take the 
substance, he should not be convicted of contravening section 1(1). 
iii) Consequence crimes 
Most crimes, for example assault and rape, require a specific act. Assault 
requires the application or threat of force to another, and rape an act of 
sexual intercourse. Other crimes, however, such as murder or culpable 
homicide, are centred around the consequences of an act. Here the crux is 
not whether the act of a person is prohibited or unlawful, but whether an act 
brought about an unlawful consequence. This consequence is usually the 
result of an unlawful act, but this is not always the case. To once again use 
an example we refer to a situation sketched by Paizes. 83 If hypothetically X 
puts liquid weed killer in an empty bottle, this is no unlawful act. Where this 
act leads to the death of Y and it was reasonably foreseeable that a person 
could mistake the weedkiller for cooldrink, X will be guilty of culpable 
homicide. If X were intoxicated at the time of putting the weedkiller into the 
bottle, to the degree that he lacked criminal capacity, he could not be found 
guilty of culpable homicide, nor could he be found guilty of contravening 
section 1(1), because he did not perform any act prohibited by law. This does 
not seem to be in accordance with the wishes or demands of the community, 
because, once again, an intoxicated person would be in a better position than 
a sober one who committed or performed the same act. 
83 Op cit (supra n 5) 787. 
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One can only assume that it was also not the intention of the legislature, 
although this is not apparent from the wording of section 1 (1 ). In all fairness 
to the legislature, it is probably impossible to draft a piece of legislation that is 
perfect in all respects and can deal with any fringe or borderline case or any 
theoretical possibilities. The legislature has to deal with the main policy thrust 
of the legal problem and cannot cater for all possible rarities that may arise. 
iv) Intoxication excluding capacity 
The wording of section 1 (1) specifically refers to an accused's lack of criminal 
capacity. The section refers to the ability of a person to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his acts or to act in accordance with that appreciation. The 
exact wording used by the legislature comprises both the cognitive and 
conative components of the test to determine criminal capacity. Whether a 
person may be convicted of contravening section 1 (1) if the impairment of his 
faculties results not in total criminal incapacity, but only in the absence of 
intention or the ability to perform a voluntary act is open to interpretation and 
debate. With regard to intoxication that excludes criminal capacity, the 
position is very clear. The absence of criminal capacity is an element of the 
offence created by section 1 (1 ). 
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The Chretiena4 case clearly states that intoxication may be an absolute 
defence on three possible grounds, namely a lack of criminal capacity, 
exclusion of intention or the prevention of performing a voluntary act. Section 
1 (1) will undoubtedly apply when the consumption or use of a substance 
results in a lack of criminal capacity. It will, however, also have to be proven 
that the lack of capacity was directly a result of the intoxication_ as 
v) Intoxication excluding intention 
It may be assumed that a person cannot be found guilty of contravening 
section 1 ( 1) where the consumption or use of the substance leads to a lack of 
intention.as 
If the legislature wanted to include such cases, it could and should have 
specifically done so. The use of the word "faculties" at various points in 
subsections (1) and (2) further reinforces this assumption, because "faculties" 
are directly related to a person's criminal capacity. The subjective knowledge 
required for intent is not even hinted at in the legislation. If this interpretation, 
which would greatly reduce the application of section 1 (1 ), is accepted, the 
whole process of the creation of a statutory offence would, to a large degree, 
have been futile. An example may be the Chretien case, the very reason for 
the existence of section 1 (1 ). In this case, the accused did have criminal 
84 Supra (n2 ). 
85 Burchell and Hunt op cit (supra n 22) 191. 
86 Snyman op cit (n 12) 218. See also Burchell and Milton op cit (supra n 22) 267; Burchell and Hunt op cit 
(supra n 22) 189. 
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capacity, but was acquitted of attempted murder because he lacked the 
intention to kill. The accused will thus also escape liability of a conviction of 
the section 1 (1) offence because his intoxication simply led to a lack of 
intention and not to a lack of criminal capacity. The cure to the problem 
would not solve the problem for which it was created. The whole exercise of 
Parliament would have been futile, unless a court could specifically find that 
the intoxication excluded the accused's criminal capacity. 
It should be mentioned that when one ventures into the field of interpretation 
of statutes, the intention of the legislature has to be taken into account by the 
court. The intention of the legislature in this case was to comply with the boni 
mores of society. The legislature deviated from a juridically correct approach 
to satisfy the demands of the community. The preamble to Act 1 of 1988, of 
which the Afrikaans version was signed, states "om sekere handelinge verrig 
deur persona wie se geestesvermoens deur inname of gebruik van sekere 
stowwe aangetas is, strafbaar te maak; en om voorsiening to maak, vir 
aangeleenthede wat daarmee in verband staan." One must assume that the 
legislature erred in not including a lack of intention under the scope of section 
1 (1 ). 
It is a general rule of interpretation of statutes that when a statute creates any 
crime, a strict interpretation of the statute is required. Prejudice to an 
accused can be great, so interpretation should always be in favour of the 
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accused in grey areas. Looking at the wording of section 1 (1) as adopted by 
Parliament, intoxication excluding intention is not within the scope of section 
1 (1) and in facts similar to the Chretien case the accused will still escape all 
liability. 
vi) Intoxication excluding a voluntary act 
Although the same argument submitted with regard to intoxication excluding 
intention as discussed above, may be brought to an exclusion of the ability to 
act, the problem in this instance is rather more self-explanatory. The degree 
of intoxication required for a state of automatism is surely a far more intense 
form than the degree of intoxication where a person no longer has criminal 
capacity. It can thus be assumed that the legislature intended to cover this 
scenario and would not want to exclude the more serious form of 
intoxication. 87 
87 Burchell and Milton op cit (supra n 22) 267; Burchell and Hunt op cit (supra n 22) 190. 
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E. DIFFICULTIES RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 1(1) 
The burden of proving every single element of a crime beyond all reasonable 
doubt, rests upon the state and this includes all the elements of the statutory 
crime created by section 1 ( 1 ). In the normal course of events, the state will 
be in the process of proving all the elements of the substantive or original 
crime with which the accused was charged and that includes the requirement 
that the accused should have acted with the necessary criminal capacity. 
The state would fervently seek evidence and argue strenuously that the court 
should indeed find that the accused had criminal capacity at the time of the 
commission of the act. If, however, the court found that there is a mere 
reasonable possibility that the accused did in fact lack criminal capacity, the 
accused would be acquitted on the main charge and the prosecution seeking 
a conviction unde·r section 1 ( 1 ) would be forced to make a dramatic volte 
face.88 The state would now have to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that 
the accused consumed or used an intoxicating substance which he knew 
would impair his faculties and which did impair his faculties at the time he 
committed the prohibited act. This total about face would be very awkward 
for the state and according to Paizes, mildly amusing to the legal academic. 
The stringent test of proving beyond all reasonable doubt the lack of criminal 
capacity as required by the Mbele89 case makes the section extremely difficult 
to prove. 
88 Paizes op cit (supra n 5) 780. 
89 Supra (n 71). 
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The Mbele90 case provides a good example of the difficulties surrounding the 
application of section 1 ( 1 ). In this case the accused was charged with theft 
but the magistrate found that, due to being under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor, the accused lacked criminal capacity. The accused was accordingly 
convicted of contravening section 1 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. On 
review it was held that if there was uncertainty as to whether the accused's 
faculties were impaired to the necessary degree he should not be found 
guilty of contravening section 1 ( 1 ). The state should actually prove that the 
accused's faculties were impaired at the time when he performed the act. In 
this case the court of review decided that there was uncertainty as to the 
accused's state of intoxication, so the conviction and sentence of the 
magistrates' court were set aside. 
Snyman wrote a lengthy commentary on this judgement which will be briefly 
mentioned.91 He reiterates that Flemming J set aside the conviction because 
there was uncertainty regarding the accused's state of intoxication. He states 
that Flemming J was never in favour of section 1 ( 1) and regards it as a 
statutory form of versari in re illicita. This obviously must have influenced his 
interpretation of the section. Snyman feels that the creating of the offence 
was, in fact, necessary, but that it should have its application limited to violent 
crimes. The fact that the magistrate's verdict of guilty was set aside implies, 
according to Snyman, that if a person is acquitted because he was so drunk 
90 Supra (n 76). 
91 CR Snyman '"n Koel ontvangs vir statutere dronkenskap" 1991 TSAR 504. 
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that there is reasonable doubt as to his criminal capacity, he cannot 
automatically be found guilty of contravening section 1 (1 ). The state would 
have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused lacked capacity 
and Rumpff C J in the Chretien92 case held that the court would only find this 
in most exceptional circumstances. This combined with Flemming J's strict 
interpretation of the section, will make section 1 ( 1) practically impossible to 
use in the future. 
Procedurally the state will also face the problem that when the court gives 
judgement with regard to the criminal capacity of the accused, all the 
evidence of the state would already have been led. The state would just have 
asked the court to find that the accused does have criminal capacity but if this 
is not decided by the court, the state on the same evidence has to ask the 
court to find beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused lacked criminal 
capacity. Even if the court granted an application for the re-opening of the 
state case, all the witnesses the state had at its disposal would have already 
been called and they no doubt would have testified that the accused was not 
severely under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The possibility of the state 
discharging its onus of proof does not seem very likely. 
Further problems are created by the fact that, contrary to the 
recommendations of the Law Commission, Parliament inserted the phrase 
"but is not criminally liable because his faculties were impaired as aforesaid". 
92 Supra (n2). 
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It appears that this phrase in fact adds a new element to the offence created 
in section 1 (1 ). The state has the near impossible burden of proving, not only 
that the accused is not criminally liable, but also beyond any reasonable 
doubt that the impairment of his faculties in the manner described in the 
subsection is the cause of the non-liability.93 The state has to prove that the 
accused is not criminally liable while the use of the phrase "but has not been 
convicted of an offence " by the legislature would have greatly facilitated the 
task of the state. If an accused is acquitted by the court, it does not 
automatically mean that he was not liable. Non-conviction does not 
necessarily imply non-liability proven beyond all reasonable doubt. 
As mentioned above, the state's whole approach is strangely inverted: after 
seeking to establish liability it now has to prove non-liability. So if an 
intoxicated person is in the grey area where neither his liability or non-liability 
can be established on the very stringent criminal law standard of proof, he will 
escape all liability.94 The twilight zone of the semi-drunk offers asylum, as 
here there would always be reasonable doubt. 95 Beyond all this even if the 
state succeeds in proving the accused's non-liability, it still has to prove the 
causal connection between the impairment of the accused's faculties and his 
non-liability. 96 
93 Paizes op cit (supra n 5) 780. 
94 Paizes op cit (supra n 5) 781. 
95 Paizes op cit (supra n 5) 781. 
96 Paizes op cit (supra n 5) 782. 
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The state has to prove that the accused would, in fact, be criminally liable, 
were if not for the impairment of his faculties by the consumption or use of the 
substance involved. This problem concerning causation could easily have 
been avoided by Parliament merely adopting the phrase "has not been 
convicted of some other offence, because it has been found by the court that 
his faculties were impaired" and not the phrase "but is not criminally liable".97 
Section 1 (2) makes a conviction of contravening section 1 (1) a competent 
verdict on any charge. It is advisable that an unrepresented accused is 
warned before any evidence is led about any competent verdicts of which he 
may be convicted. However, in certain case law, criticism was leveled 
against the state for putting section 1 ( 1) as an alternative charge. 98 The 
rationale of the criticism was that the contravention of section 1 ( 1) is 
automatically a competent verdict and that it should not have been put to the 
accused as an alternative.99 It therefore appears that where there is evidence 
that intoxicating liquor played a role in the facts before the court, the court 
must at the first possible opportunity explain the implications of section 1 ( 1) 
as a competent verdict to the accused. 
97 Paizes op cit (supra n 5) 782. 
98 Mphangatie supra (n 48). 
99 SE van der Merwe "Skuldig maar ontoerekeningsvatbaaar Dronk" 1990 Stell. LR 101. 
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With regard to a similar amendment Act100 it was stated on review in R v 
Eck 101 that the crime created was a new crime and not well-known as is the 
case with section 1(1). The court then stated that this was even more reason 
why its implications and the fact that it is a competent verdict should be 
clearly explained to an unrepresented accused. It was surely the legislature's 
intention that the fact that a contravention of section 1 ( 1 ) is a competent 
verdict to any charge, should primarily be a convenience arrangement and 
not a procedural trap for the ignorant. 
100 General Law Amendment Act 50of1956. 
101 1958 (2) SA 182 (0). 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Section 1 (1) is the fulfilment of Parliament's democratic duty to create laws which 
comply with the boni mores and demands of the community. It has a right of 
existence and no criticism should be levelled for the departure from the purely 
jurisprudential approach. 
It is submitted, however, that the legislature erred in the wording of section 1 ( 1 ). In 
its current form it finds little application in practice. Paizes calls the provision 
unworkable, illogical and inconsistent.102 Section 1 (1) does not provide a remedy for 
the problem for which it was created. The lacuna surrounding "intoxication excluding 
intention" and the difficulty of proving the element of no criminal capacity beyond all 
reasonable doubt, makes one agree with the very strong views of Paizes.103 
The solution then is to perfect section 1 ( 1 ) into a piece of legislation that avoids as 
far as possible the points of criticism mentioned above, satisfies the needs of the 
community, and is effective in covering all circumstances for which it was created. 
This would again require legislative intervention and the views of the following 
writers should be given serious consideration. 
Van der Merwe104 suggests the following example for a Section 1 (1) type offence. 
102 Op cit (n 5) 777. 
103 Compare also the views expressed in Burchell and Hunt op cit (supra n 22) 200. 
104 NJ van der Merwe "Compendium" 1996 Justice College 125. 
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"1 (1) A person, who unlawfully and intentionally or negligently causes himself, 
through the intake of alcoholic or some other intoxicating drug, to become so 
intoxicated as to lack criminal responsibility or to reach the stage where his 
criminal responsibility is diminished and in that condition creates a danger to 
the property or interests of another, shall be guilty of an offence and upon 
conviction be liable to a sentence of ...... . 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) a person who has caused himself to reach 
a condition where he lacks criminal responsibility or such criminal 
responsibility is diminished, is deemed to have created a danger to the 
property or interests of another, unless the contrary is proven". 
Professor R C Whiting also has submitted a draft for section 1 (1 ). 105 It reads as 
follows: 
"1 (1) Any person who unlawfully -
(a) causes the death of another person; or 
(b) applies force to the person of another; or 
(c) threatens another with the immediate application of force to his person; 
or 
(d) causes damage to the property of another person, shall be guilty of an 
offence. 
(2) The fact that a person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs 
shall be disregarded in determining his liability for an offence under 
105 Submitted to the South African Law Commission as public opinion when preparing the draft legislation for 
Project 49. 
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subsection (1 ). Provided that no person shall be convicted of an offence 
under subsection ( 1) if there is evidence from which it appears as a 
reasonable possibility that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or 
drugs in circumstances in which his intoxication could not have been avoided 
by the exercise of reasonable care on his part. 
(3) No person shall be convicted of contravening paragraph (a) of subsection (1) 
unless the court is satisfied that a reasonable person, unaffected by 
intoxicating liquor or drugs (but otherwise in the position of the accused), 
would have foreseen that his conduct might unlawfully cause the death of the 
deceased. 
( 4) No person shall be convicted of contravening paragraph (b) or ( d) of 
subsection (1) unless the court is satisfied that, disregarding any evidence 
that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, the only 
reasonable inference from the evidence would be that he foresaw that his 
conduct might constitute or result in the unlawful application of force to the 
person of the other person concerned, as the case may be." 
Hand in hand with this proposal was Whiting's recommended amendment to the 
Criminal Procedure Act, so that: 
(i) a verdict of guilty of contravening section 1 (1 )(a) would be competent on a 
charge of murder or culpable homicide; 
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(ii) a verdict of guilty of contravening section 1 (1 )(b) or (c) would be competent 
on a charge of common assault or on any charge on which a verdict of guilty 
of common assault would be competent; 
(iii) a verdict of guilty of contravening section 1 (1 )(d) would be competent on a 
charge of malicious injury to property. 
Professor Snyman agrees with Whiting that the application of a section 1 (1) type 
offence should be limited to crimes of a violent nature as this would be in 
accordance with the wishes of the community.106 The draft given by Whiting is, 
however, long, involved and cumbersome and would probably cause more confusion 
to unrepresented accused. Van der Merwe's draft once again does not seem to 
cover the area of where intoxication excludes intention. 
In Canada a similar provision dealing with cases involving intoxication has been 
enacted. Section 33.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code107 reads as follows: 
"(1) It is not a defence to an offence referred to in ss(3) that the accused, by 
reason of self-induced intoxication, lacked the general intent or the 
voluntariness required to commit the offence, where the accused departed 
markedly from the standard of care as described in ss(2). 
(2) For the purposes of this section, a person departs markedly from the standard 
of reasonable care generally recognised in Canadian society and is thereby 
criminally at fault, where the person, while in a state of self-induced 
106 Snyman op cit (n 12) 216. 
107 Enacted by SC, 1995, c 32. 
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intoxication that renders the person unaware of, or incapable of consciously 
controlling, their behaviour, voluntarily or involuntarily interferes or threatens 
to interfere with the bodily integrity of another person. 
(3) This section applies in respect of an offence under this Act or any other Act of 
Parliament that includes as an element an assault or any other interference or 
threat of interference by a person with the bodily integrity of another person." 
Professor Snyman also submits a draft for an amended section 1 (1) type offence.108 
This reads as follows: 
"Any person who voluntarily consumes or uses any substance which impairs his 
ability 
(a) to perform a voluntary act; or 
(b) to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or to act in accordance with that 
appreciation, 
while knowing that the substance has that effect, and who, while such abilities are 
thus impaired engaged in conduct which is proscribed by law under any penalty, but 
who cannot be convicted of the offence because of a reasonable doubt as to 
whether he had the aforesaid abilities, is guilty of an offence and is liable on 
conviction to the penalty, except the death penalty, which may be imposed in 
respect of the commission of that act or omission." 
108 CR Snyman A Draft Criminal Code for South Africa with a commentary (1995) 11 (s 3.12). 
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The Transkeian Penal Code of 1983 also has a section 1 (1) type offence which is 
worded as follows: 109 
"15(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) a person shall be criminally liable 
and guilty of an offence in terms of this section for any act or omission which 
would constitute an offence but for the fact that at the time of such act or 
omission such person is by reason of intoxication -
(a) incapable of knowing the nature of the act; or 
(b) incapable of knowing that what he is doing is either wrong or 
contrary to law; or 
(c) insane, temporarily or otherwise, 
and it shall be competent for the court to convict him of a contravention of this 
section notwithstanding the fact that he is charged with some other offence 
and not with a contravention of this section." 
Taking into account all these drafts listed above, an amended section 1 (1 ), in order 
to be effective, needs to deal with the following five main points of criticism: 
(a) it must determine whether the substance must be taken voluntarily or 
not; 
(b) its application should be restricted to crimes of a violent nature; 
(c) it must effectively deal with cases where intoxication excludes 
intention; 
109 S 15(1) of Act 9of1983 (Transkei). 
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( d) it must provide a solution that is workable in practice to deal with the 
requirement set out in the Mbele110 case that the state must prove lack 
of criminal liability beyond all reasonable doubt; 
(e) the section should specifically include omissiones within its scope. 
The following is suggested as a possible working draft for consideration when trying 
to formulate a section 1 ( 1) type offence which will most effectively deal with these 
points of criticism. 
"Anybody who voluntarily consumes or uses any substance which has an effect on 
his mental faculties, knowledge or intention, while he knew or should have known 
that the particular substance could or does have such an effect, and while being so 
effected engages in conduct which constitutes a crime, of which violence is an 
element, but who cannot be convicted of such crime because of a reasonsable 
doubt whether he at the time of the conduct 
(a) had the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, or to act in 
accordance with such appreciation of wrongfulness; or 
(b) had the necessary intention required for a conviction of the particular 
crime, 
is guilty of a crime and on conviction liable to the punishment of ....... " 
no Supra (n 71). 
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